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 1 
STANDING TO KNEEL:  
ANALYZING NFL PLAYERS’ FREEDOM TO 
PROTEST DURING THE PLAYING OF  
THE U.S. NATIONAL ANTHEM 
Marc Edelman* 
 
On September 22, 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump held a campaign 
rally in Huntsville, Alabama, where he suggested that the National Football 
League (NFL) should “fire” all players who politically protest during the 
playing of the U.S. national anthem (“the national anthem”).1  President 
Trump then followed his statements with a series of tweets in which he 
declared that, if the NFL continued to allow its players to protest during the 
national anthem, the U.S. government should take away the league’s 
“massive tax breaks.”2 
 
*  Professor Marc Edelman (Marc@MarcEdelman.com) is a tenured Professor of Law at the 
Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City University of New York.  He is also an 
adjunct professor at Fordham University School of Law and a columnist for Forbes 
SportsMoney.  Professor Edelman advises numerous businesses on legal issues related to 
antitrust, gaming, intellectual property, and sports law. 
 
 1. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Jonathan Martin, At Alabama Rally, Trump Toggles 
Between Republican Loyalists, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/09/22/us/politics/trump-luther-strange-alabama.html [https://perma.cc/9Y43-Q8M3]; 
see also Mark Maske, NFL Owners Could Change Anthem Policy Next Season If Protests 
Continue, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
sports/wp/2017/11/21/nfl-owners-weighing-change-to-anthem-policy-for-next-season-if-
protests-continue [https://perma.cc/AJ56-HSRY] (noting that President Trump specifically 
stated during his speech that NFL owners “should fire any player who protested during the 
anthem,” and referred to a protesting player as a being a “son of a bitch”). See generally 
Jenna Johnson, ‘I Love Alabama—It’s Special’:  At Rally for Sen. Luther Strange, Trump 
Vents Frustrations in Rambling Speech, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/09/23/i-love-alabama-its-
special-at-rally-for-sen-luther-strange-trump-vents-frustrations-in-rambling-speech 
[http://perma.cc/C23E-D3ZM] (noting the city of President Trump’s speech as Huntsville, 
Alabama). 
 2. Ylan Mui, Trump Threatens to End NFL’s ‘Massive Tax Breaks’ but His Tax Plan 
Would Be Great for Sports Teams, CNBC (Oct. 10, 2017, 2:56 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2017/10/10/trump-threatens-to-end-nfls-massive-tax-cuts-but-theres-a-huge-one-in-his-tax-
plan.html [https://perma.cc/92M9-BE9M]; see also Maske, supra note 1.  Subsequent to 
these tweets, the White House clarified that when President Trump referenced “massive tax 
breaks,” he was actually “referring to public subsidies for sports stadiums.” Tracy Jan, Did 
Trump’s Tweet Make It Safer for NFL Players to Kneel for the Anthem?, WASH. POST (Oct. 
15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/did-trumps-tweet-make-it-
safer-for-nfl-players-to-kneel-for-the-anthem/2017/10/15/d99f20ca-af44-11e7-a908-
a3470754bbb9_story.html [https://perma.cc/PWM4-2FJN]; cf. Marc Edelman, Sports and 
the City:  How to Curb Professional Sports Teams’ Demands for Free Public Stadiums, 6 
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Since President Trump threatened financial harm to NFL owners, the 
NFL teams have cut at least two protesting players—former Green Bay 
Packers tight end Marcellus Bennett and former Dallas Cowboys defensive 
end Damontre Moore.3  In addition, none of the thirty-two NFL team 
owners have signed free agent quarterback Colin Kaepernick—the player 
who spearheaded the NFL players’ recent political protests.4 
This Article analyzes whether an NFL player who protests during the 
national anthem has any legal recourse if he is fired—or not hired—as a 
result of his political protests.  Part I of this Article describes the history of 
NFL players engaging in political protests during the national anthem.  Part 
II explores whether the firing of an NFL player for his political protests 
would violate the player’s constitutional right to free speech.  Finally, Part 
III discusses whether the firing—or not hiring—of an NFL player for his 
political protests would violate the player’s rights under the terms of the 
league’s collective bargaining agreement. 
I.  NFL PLAYER PROTESTS DURING THE NATIONAL ANTHEM 
Although commercial sporting events in the United States operate 
primarily within the private sector, most contest organizers incorporate 
certain patriotic traditions, such as the playing of the national anthem, into 
their events.5  These patriotic traditions allow for professional athletes to 
 
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35 (2008) (discussing sports teams’ demands for free public 
stadiums and measures that Congress could implement to curb such public funding). 
 3. See Packers Cut TE Martellus Bennett, FOX SPORTS (Nov. 9, 2017, 10:18 AM), 
https://www.foxsports.com/wisconsin/story/green-bay-packers-cut-martellus-bennett-110817 
[https://perma.cc/2NHD-4SS2] (explaining that Packers management cited a failure to 
disclose a physical injury as their reason for releasing Martellus Bennett); Ari Gilberg, 
Cowboys Cut Damontre Moore, Who Raised Fist at End of Anthem, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 
25, 2017, 7:27 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/giants/cowboys-cut-
damontre-moore-raised-fist-anthem-article-1.3588976 [https://perma.cc/V4PL-CZFZ] 
(discussing the Dallas Cowboys’ decision to cut defensive end Damontre Moore).  
 4. See Valerie Richardson, NFL Take-a-Knee Protests Make Comeback as 19 Players 
Refuse to Stand for Anthem, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2017), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/nov/26/nfl-take-knee-protests-make-
comeback/ [https://perma.cc/P778-BK4Q]; see also Christopher L. Gasper, No Reason to 
Pass on Kaepernick, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 19, 2017, at C1 (explaining that Kaepernick has not 
been able to find a new NFL team since he “knelt during the national anthem last season to 
protest police brutality and social injustice”).  In response to the sudden lack of interest in his 
service, Kaepernick has filed a labor grievance against the NFL, alleging that the league’s 
thirty-two teams colluded not to sign him this past season. See Evan Grossman & Leonard 
Greene, Colin Kaepernick Files Grievance Alleging Collusion by NFL Owners, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Oct. 15, 2017, 11:07 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/colin-
kaepernick-files-grievance-alleging-collusion-nfl-owners-article-1.3565129 
[https://perma.cc/8QTL-8SWN] (discussing the specifics of the collusion complaint that 
Kaepernick filed against the thirty-two NFL teams); see also Mark Maske, Colin 
Kaepernick’s Attorneys Seek Deposition of Roger Goodell in Collusion Grievance, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2017/11/05/colin-
kaepernicks-attorneys-seek-deposition-of-roger-goodell-in-collusion-grievance 
[https://perma.cc/2BLN-US9X] (noting that attorneys for Kaepernick seek to depose NFL 
Commissioner Roger Goodell and various NFL team owners as part of their collusion 
grievance); Gasper, supra (arguing that the NFL is “collectively boycotting Kaepernick”). 
 5. See infra notes 6–10 and accompanying text. 
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showcase their national pride.  However, these traditions also 
unintentionally invite athletes to engage in political protests.  Part I.A 
provides a brief history of playing the Star-Spangled Banner at U.S. 
sporting events, as well as the way in which U.S. professional athletes have 
responded to the anthem’s playing.  Part I.B looks at the NFL’s practice of 
playing the national anthem before games, and NFL players’ responses to 
that practice. 
A.  Brief Historic Overview 
Most U.S. sporting events today begin with the playing of our national 
anthem, the Star-Spangled Banner.6  Historians trace this tradition back to 
Major League Baseball’s 1918 World Series, when the Boston Red Sox 
played the Chicago Cubs.7  During the seventh inning of “a particularly 
depressing Cubs game,” a military band appeared on the Cubs’ home field 
and offered its rendition of the Star-Spangled Banner.8  The band’s 
performance energized both fans and players alike, with players on both 
teams turning toward the flag and offering military salutes.9 
Other professional sports teams took notice and, by the end of World 
War II, most U.S. sports teams had adopted the practice of playing the Star-
Spangled Banner before the start of each game.10  For some athletes, such 
as former Red Sox third baseman Fred Thomas, the pregame rendition of 
the national anthem invoked a feeling of camaraderie and patriotism.11  For 
others, the feelings were more equivocal.12  Meanwhile, for a very small 
 
 6. See Becky Little, Why the Star-Spangled Banner Is Played at Sporting Events, 
HISTORY (Sept. 25, 2017), http://www.history.com/news/why-the-star-spangled-banner-is-
played-at-sporting-events [https://perma.cc/V8LM-CN2P] (discussing the history of playing 
the Star-Spangled Banner at professional sports games). 
 7. See Avi Selk, How the National Anthem—and Subverting It—Became a Pregame 
Tradition in America, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/retropolis/wp/2017/09/24/how-the-national-anthem-and-subverting-it-became-a-
pregame-tradition-in-america/?utm_term=.7f3300d80774 [https://perma.cc/76AM-JDCF]; 
see also Little, supra note 6 (explaining that, at the time, the Star-Spangled Banner had not 
yet even officially become the national anthem). But see Olivia B. Waxman, Here’s How 
Standing for the National Anthem Became Part of U.S. Sports Tradition, TIME (Sept. 25, 
2017), http://time.com/4955623/history-national-anthem-sports-nfl [https://perma.cc/5J5L-
B6ND] (linking the earliest example of the playing of the Star-Spangled Banner at a baseball 
game back to a game played in Brooklyn on May 15, 1862). 
 8. Selk, supra note 7. 
 9. Id. (describing how the band’s performance of the Star-Spangled Banner led Fred 
Thomas, the Boston Red Sox third baseman and a Navy veteran, to launch into a military 
salute that was followed by other players and fans who sang along and burst into applause). 
 10. See Little, supra note 6 (explaining that, “by the end of World War II, NFL 
Commissioner Elmer Layden ordered [the Star-Spangled Banner] be played at every football 
game”).  
 11. See Selk, supra note 7 (describing how Fred Thomas launched into a military salute 
during the Star-Spangled Banner at Game Three of the 1918 World Series). 
 12. See Stephen Hewitt, Indifferent Reaction to NFL’s Anthem Memo in Patriots Locker 
Room, BOS. HERALD (Oct. 10, 2017), http://www.bostonherald.com/sports/patriots/the_blitz/ 
2017/10/indifferent_reaction_to_nfls_anthem_memo_in_patriots_locker_room 
[https://perma.cc/2R2P-MTK6] (describing one New England Patriots player as “sound[ing] 
indifferent” about being required to stand for the national anthem). 
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minority of athletes, the playing of the national anthem invoked a feeling of 
anger and the desire to protest.13 
Perhaps the most prominent case of athletes protesting during the 
national anthem occurred during the 1968 Summer Olympics in Mexico 
City, Mexico.14  There, Black-American sprinters Tommie Smith and John 
Carlos turned their backs to the American flag and raised their fists to 
protest racial injustice as the national anthem played.15  In the immediate 
aftermath of their protest, both athletes were ostracized by the U.S. sporting 
community and received death threats.16  However, over time, much of this 
anger faded.  Tommie Smith thereafter played a season as a wide receiver 
on the NFL’s Cincinnati Bengals, and later he became an assistant coach for 
basketball and track at Oberlin College and an esteemed member of his 
local community.17  Meanwhile, John Carlos went on to become a high 
school track coach, in-school suspension supervisor, and school 
counselor.18 
Another, somewhat less publicized, athlete protest to the national anthem 
took place in March 1996 when Denver Nuggets basketball player 
Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf refused to stand for the anthem because he claimed 
the tenets of his Islamic religion disallowed “nationalistic ritualism.”19  At 
around the same time, Abdul-Rauf also described the American flag as “a 
symbol of oppression that went against his Muslim beliefs.”20  At first, the 
National Basketball Association suspended Abdul-Rauf indefinitely from 
 
 13. See Selk, supra note 7; see also Patrick Strickland, ‘Take a Knee’ Anti-Racist 
Protests Move Beyond the NFL, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 20, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/ 
news/2017/10/knee-anti-racist-protests-move-nfl-171019153538456.html [https://perma.cc/ 
MT46-SAQJ] (discussing the long history of protests in sports, especially among Black 
Americans, as “a platform for social justice activism”); Zach Johnk, National Anthem 
Protests by Black Athletes Have a Long History, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/sports/national-anthem-protests-black-athletes.html 
[https://perma.cc/R9FR-YSWZ] (discussing the history of Black athletes protesting during 
the national anthem). 
 14. See Selk, supra note 7. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See David Davis, Olympic Athletes Who Took a Stand, SMITHSONIAN, 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/articles/olympic-athletes-who-took-a-stand-593920/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZKR4-W6K2]. 
 17. See Alicia Smith-Tran, After Tommie Smith Took a Stand at the 1968 Olympics, He 
Took His Place as a Coach at Oberlin, OBERLIN ALUMNI MAG., Spring 2016, at 16 
http://www2.oberlin.edu/alummag/spring2016/issue/html5forwebkit.html?page=16 
[https://perma.cc/6NBY-XSQR]; see also John Fay, Anthem Protest at ‘68 Olympics Rocked 
the Nation:  A Year Later, the Bengals Signed Tommie Smith, WCPO (Sept. 25, 2017, 12:47 
PM), https://www.wcpo.com/news/insider/fay-anthem-protest-at-68-olympics-rocked-the-
nation-a-year-later-the-bengals-signed-tommie-smith [https://perma.cc/AUZ5-APF8]. 
 18. Biography, JOHN CARLOS, http://www.johncarlos68.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/ 
10/john-carlos-biography.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BUS-7KNX] (last visited Jan. 6, 2018). 
 19. Assoc. Press, Unmoved by Suspension, Abdul-Rauf Still Won’t Stand, ATLANTA J. & 
CONST., Mar. 14, 1996, at E5; see also Cindy Boren, Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf on Colin 




 20. See Boren, supra note 19. 
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the league.21  However, after Abdul-Rauf missed one game under this 
suspension, a compromise solution was reached:  Abdul-Rauf agreed to 
stand while praying with his head down during the playing of the anthem.22 
B.  NFL Anthem Policies and Political Protests 
Whereas professional baseball and basketball players have historically 
stood at attention during the national anthem, until 2009 NFL players 
remained in the locker room.23  Then, nine years ago, NFL team owners 
changed their policy.24  The new NFL policy states that the national anthem 
“must be played prior to every NFL game.”25  The new policy, which 
appears in the NFL’s operating manual, also states that players “should 
stand at attention” during the anthem and “face the flag, hold helmets in 
their left hand and refrain from talking.”26 
Although the NFL’s new national anthem policy does not appear 
anywhere in the league’s Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA),27 there 
also is no public evidence of any players objecting to the policy change in 
2009.  However, during the 2016 NFL preseason, former San Francisco 
49ers (“49ers”) quarterback Kaepernick captured media attention—both 
positive and negative—when he decided to kneel during the national 
anthem to protest police brutality against Black Americans.28  Kaepernick, 
who served as the starting quarterback for the 49ers during their 2012 to 
2013 National Football Conference Championship season, hoped that his 
protests would bring attention to police officers’ disproportionate shooting 
of Black people in the United States.29  While it is uncertain whether 
Kaepernick’s protests ever fully accomplished their desired result, it is 
 
 21. See Jesse Washington, Still No Anthem, Still No Regrets for Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf, 
UNDEFEATED (Sept. 1, 2016), https://theundefeated.com/features/abdul-rauf-doesnt-regret-
sitting-out-national-anthem [https://perma.cc/5X2D-A9VZ]. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See Maske, supra note 1. 
 24. Yaron Steinbuch, NFL May Tweak Rules to Make Players Stand for Anthem, N.Y. 
POST (Oct. 10, 2017), https://nypost.com/2017/10/10/nfl-may-tweak-rules-to-make-players-
stand-for-anthem/ [https://perma.cc/9NKY-4PWA]. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See infra Part III. 
 28. See Gasper, supra note 4; Richardson, supra note 4; see also Sonja Bochow, Black 
Army Ranger Won’t Accept Colin Kaepernick’s Actions Against U.S. Anthem—Gives This 
Advice . . ., RIGHT WING NEWS (Aug. 27, 2016), http://rightwingnews.com/military/black-
army-ranger-wont-accept-colin-kaepernicks-actions-u-s-anthem-gives-advice/ 
[https://perma.cc/PSQ2-VWU4] (quoting Kaepernick as stating that “I am not going to stand 
up to show pride in a flag for a country that oppresses black people and people of color”). 
 29. See Strickland, supra note 13 (explaining that American police officers killed at least 
1093 people in 2016, with almost 25 percent of those individuals being Black even though 
Black people make up roughly 12 percent of the U.S. population); see also Earl Ufari 
Hutchinson, Commentary:  Kaepernick’s Sit-Down Aside, the Case of Whether to Stand for 
the National Anthem, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 30, 2016, 8:25 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/opinion/commentary/ct-colin-kaepernick-anthem-sit-down-blacks-stand-perspec-0830-
jm-20160829-story.html [https://perma.cc/WVP3-5R2L] (opining that “Kaepernick showed 
guts in telling the world that he would not stand because of the continued abuse and killing 
of blacks by law enforcement officials”). 
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undeniable that, by protesting, he angered certain segments of the U.S. 
military and police communities.30 
Although Kaepernick was initially the only NFL player to kneel during 
the national anthem, a few other players soon began to join him.31  By the 
start of the 2016 NFL regular season, 49ers safety Eric Reid, Seattle 
Seahawks cornerback Jeremy Lane, and Denver Broncos linebacker 
Brandon Marshall had emulated Kaepernick’s kneeling posture during the 
national anthem.32  Then, on September 19, 2016, others, including 
Philadelphia Eagles safety Malcolm Jenkins, joined the protest 
movement.33  Yet, rather than kneel during the national anthem, Jenkins 
and others raised their fists in the air much like Tommie Smith and John 
Carlos had done during the 1968 Olympics.34 
Several other Black football players also began to protest following the 
November 8, 2016 election of President Donald Trump—a law-and-order 
candidate who has a poor relationship with the Black community.35  
Meanwhile, before the 2017 NFL regular season, other players began to 
protest based on numerous grounds including:  Black NFL player Michael 
Bennett’s accusations that he had been a victim of police brutality,36 the 
death of a human rights protester during an August 2017 White supremacist 
rally in Charlottesville, Virginia,37 and President Trump’s overzealous 
attempts to use social media to insult many of the earliest NFL protesters.38 
 
 30. See generally Bochow, supra note 28 (explaining one Black army ranger’s 
disagreement with Kaepernick’s position on standing for the national anthem). 
 31. See Mark Sandritter, A Timeline of Colin Kaepernick’s National Anthem Protest and 
the Athletes Who Joined Him, SB NATION (Sept. 25, 2017, 10:28 AM), 
https://www.sbnation.com/2016/9/11/12869726/colin-kaepernick-national-anthem-protest-
seahawks-brandon-marshall-nfl [https://perma.cc/95AU-S9CQ]. 
 32. Id.; see also Nicki Jhabvala, Broncos’ Brandon Marshall Kneels During National 
Anthem in Tampa Bay, DENV. POST (Oct. 3, 2016, 2:06 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/ 
2016/10/02/broncos-brandon-marshall-national-anthem-buccaneers/ [https://perma.cc/3FRQ-
ZG6R]. 
 33. T.J. Neer, Philadelphia Eagles Safety and Former OSU Football Player Malcolm 




 34. See id. 
 35. See, e.g., Des Bieler, Bucs’ Mike Evans Kneels During Anthem to Protest Donald 
Trump’s Election Victory, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/early-lead/wp/2016/11/13/bucs-mike-evans-kneels-during-anthem-to-protest-donald-
trumps-election-victory [https://perma.cc/T95J-ZNYV] (explaining that Tampa Bay 
Buccaneers wide receiver Mike Evans was the first NFL player to explicitly link his protests 
to Donald Trump’s election). 
 36. See Jarrett Bell, Michael Bennett’s Police Incident Illustrates Reason for Protests, 
USA TODAY (Sept. 6, 2017, 8:15 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/columnist/ 
bell/2017/09/06/michael-bennett-police-incident-protest-seattle-seahawks/640041001/ 
[https://perma.cc/RST5-HTXB] (describing how the alleged police brutality against Michael 
Bennett reinforced the true reasoning for the NFL player protests).  
 37. See Ryan Wilson, First White NFL Player to Kneel During National Anthem 
Explains His Decision, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/ 
first-white-nfl-player-to-kneel-during-national-anthem-explains-his-decision 
[https://perma.cc/EQB3-5VVB] (explaining that Seth DeValve, a 2016 fourth-round draft 
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As recently as November 28, 2017, twenty-four NFL players continue to 
either kneel or lift their fists to protest police brutality and racial injustice 
during the national anthem.39  One such protestor is Tennessee Titans wide 
receiver Rishard Matthews—a player whose father and brother were both 
U.S. Marines, and whose brother tragically died while fighting for his 
country in Afghanistan.40  Although these protests remain highly 
controversial in their substance, the protests have always been nonviolent in 
nature, and they have never implied any hatred or disrespect for the United 
States. 
II.  NFL PLAYER PROTESTS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
As President Trump has attempted to use strong-arm tactics to quell NFL 
players’ protests during the national anthem, many have wondered if NFL 
players have a legal cause of action if they are fired—or not hired—based 
on their political protests.41 
Greatly oversimplified, there are at least two types of legal protections 
that may attach to NFL players who engage in political protests during the 
national anthem:  those that arise under constitutional law and those that 
arise under the terms of the NFL CBA.42  This Part analyzes whether 
constitutional law protects an NFL player from being fired—or not hired—
based on his expression of political protests during playing of the national 
anthem.  Part II.A provides an overview of the First Amendment’s Free 
Speech Clause, including the notion that only “state actors” must not 
 
pick from Princeton University, became the first White player to kneel during the national 
anthem in response to the race-based attacks on protesters in Charlottesville, Virginia). 
 38. See Benjamin Hoffman, Victor Mather & Jacey Fortin, After Trump Blasts N.F.L., 
Players Kneel and Lock Arms in Solidarity, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/24/sports/nfl-trump-anthem-protests.html 
[http://perma.cc/9D3P-GB24] (explaining that on Sunday, September 22, 2017, “N.F.L. 
players across the country demonstrated during the national anthem . . . in a show of 
solidarity against President Trump, who scolded the league and players on Twitter [for 
earlier protests]”). 
 39. See Cindy Boren, Trump Tweets that NFL Is ‘Weak and out of Control’ Because of 
Players’ National Anthem Demonstrations, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2017/11/28/trump-tweets-that-nfl-is-
weak-and-out-of-control-because-of-players-national-anthem-demonstrations 
[https://perma.cc/4LHT-AE7Y]; Jan, supra note 2. 
 40. See Jan, supra note 2 (noting that, despite the claims by President Donald Trump 
that kneeling during the national anthem is disrespectful to the U.S. military, among the 
players who continue to kneel in protest to racial injustice include Rishard Matthews, a 
player whose father is a Marine and whose brother died in Afghanistan in 2015). 
 41. See id. (addressing whether any freedom of speech grounds exist that would protect 
NFL players’ protest rights); see Des Bieler, Michael Bennett Says He’ll Continue to Sit 
During Anthem Despite NFL’s Preference, WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2017/10/18/michael-bennett-says-hell-
continue-to-sit-during-anthem-despite-nfls-preference [https://perma.cc/7B86-4JUC] 
(quoting NFL owner and Fordham University School of Law graduate John Mara as 
conceding that “one of the things our forefathers fought and died for, and that continues to 
be a principle that’s very important to most of us” is the right to protest).  
 42. See infra Part III. 
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infringe free speech rights.  Part II.B then discusses whether terminating an 
NFL player for protesting would constitute “state action.” 
A.  An Overview of the First Amendment  
Right to Free Speech 
Under constitutional law, the strongest argument that certain NFL players 
enjoy a protectable right to protest comes from the Free Speech Clause of 
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.43  In pertinent part, the First 
Amendment states that the government cannot engage in “abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”44 
As explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in Texas v. Johnson,45 the term 
“speech,” as referenced in the U.S. Constitution, includes not only the 
spoken or written word, but also conduct with sufficient communicative 
elements to constitute expression.46  For example, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that both wearing black armbands to protest American military 
involvement in the Vietnam War47 and burning the American flag 
constitute forms of “speech.”48  Thus, kneeling or lifting a fist during the 
national anthem would likewise meet today’s Constitutional definition of 
“speech.”49 
Nevertheless, the First Amendment does not protect all employees who 
are terminated based upon their speech.50  The First Amendment simply 
prohibits a state actor from limiting an employee’s right to speak on 
matters of public concern, so long as the employee’s interest in speaking is 
not outweighed by a substantial interference to the workplace.51  A private 
employer is typically not a state actor.  Thus, a private employer typically 
would not have any constitutional obligation to afford its employees free 
speech rights unless there is a nexus between the private employer’s actions 
and the government.52 
 
 43. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 44. Id. 
 45. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 46. Id. at 404. 
 47. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
 48. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420. 
 49. See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text. 
 50. See infra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
 51. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (noting, for example, that “a 
public employer may, consistently with the First Amendment, prohibit its employees from 
being ‘rude to customers,’ a standard almost certainly too vague when applied to the public 
at large”). 
 52. See Mary Becker, How Free Is Speech at Work?, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 815, 842 
(1996) (stating that “[t]he Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment protects only against 
state action and thus affords no protection when private employers retaliate against private 
employees for speech”); see also Wickersham v. City of Columbia, 481 F.3d 591, 598 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (finding that a “close nexus” with state action—a private actor that acts under the 
color of state law—renders a private employer into a state actor). 
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B.  Is Terminating NFL Players for Protesting  
a Form of “State Action?” 
To determine whether firing a protesting NFL player constitutes a form 
of state action, one must look at whether there exists a sufficient nexus 
between the player’s NFL employer and government activity.53  The 
simple, gut reaction to that question is there probably is not such a nexus.  
However, upon more careful analysis, one could construe two potential 
arguments for why an NFL team’s firing—or not hiring—of a political 
protester may constitute state action. 
The first potential argument is that some NFL teams play their games in 
publicly-owned stadiums or, at least, in stadiums that are greatly subsidized 
by municipal governments.54  In the 1978 decision of Ludtke v. Kuhn,55 the  
Southern District of New York held that New York City’s ownership rights 
over the lease to Yankee Stadium transformed the Yankees’ ban against 
female reporters in the Yankees Clubhouse from a private employer action 
into state action under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.56  Based on this conclusion, there is at least some 
precedent, albeit under different clauses of the Constitution, to tie stadium 
ownership and funding to state action.57 
Alternatively, and perhaps far more compellingly, President Trump’s 
repeated statements that threaten to remove “massive tax breaks” from NFL 
teams unless they “fire” protesting players also may amount to state action 
by the executive branch to curb political speech, applied through the 
instrumentality of the NFL team owners.58  Indeed, in the 1963 Supreme 
Court decision Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,59 the Court found state 
action where a government entity used the “threat of invoking legal 
 
 53. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
 54. See Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86, 93–96 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that a 
professional sports team that receives municipal aid toward the costs of use of a publicly-
owned stadium engages in “public action” when it denies female reporters access to the 
team’s clubhouse facilities located within the stadium); see also Burton v. Wilmington 
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (explaining that there is no rigid yardstick to 
determine whether state action in a given case exists, and that “[o]nly by sifting facts and 
weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be 
attributed its true significance”).  
 55. 461 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 56. Id. at 95.  
 57. Nevertheless, the situation here is not fully analogous to the situation in Ludtke.  
There, a public entity technically owned the facility in which the female reporter wished to 
gain access but, here, there is no bona fide argument that a public entity actually owns or 
controls any NFL team. See id.  While the analogy with Ludtke might be very compelling if 
an NFL team sought to ban a player from a sports facility based on his political speech, the 
analogy is perhaps useful, but somewhat imperfect, where the underlying conduct in 
question entails the firing of a worker rather than denying facility access. 
 58. See Jan, supra note 2 (quoting legal scholars—including myself, American 
University law professor N. Jeremi Duru, and American Civil Liberties Union’s national 
legal director David Cole—for the position that President Trump’s efforts to financially 
bully the NFL teams into punishing players for protesting could constitute state action, 
giving rise to the claim of protection under the First Amendment).  
 59. 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
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sanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation” to 
induce private entities to act in a way that chills free speech rights.60  
Subsequently, in Playboy Enterprises v. Meese III,61 the District Court for 
the District of Columbia similarly recognized that the federal government 
engages in state action that may violate the First Amendment where the 
government takes actions to facilitate private actors’ ability to blacklist 
private third parties.62  Based on these two decisions, one can make a 
reasonable argument that President Trump’s threat to strip “massive tax 
breaks” from team owners who allow players to protest the anthem serves 
as a form of “threat of invoking legal sanctions” that violates protesting 
NFL players’ First Amendment rights. 
III.  NFL PLAYER PROTESTS AND  
THE NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 
In addition to the constitutional arguments in defense of the protesting 
NFL players, there is an entirely separate argument that the “firing” or 
“concerted not hiring” of an NFL player who protests during the national 
anthem gives rise to a cause of action.  Namely, such firing or concerted not 
hiring may violate a player’s labor rights under the NFL’s CBA.63  In 
certain respects, the NFL players’ rights under the NFL CBA are more 
limited than similar rights under the U.S. Constitution.64  For example, the 
CBA does not necessarily protect all forms of speech that would be 
protected for public employees under constitutional free speech 
principles.65  Yet, in other respects, a claim of wrongful “firing” or 
“concerted not hiring” under the CBA is broader in scope because it would 
not require a player bringing a labor grievance under the CBA to prove state 
action.66 
Part III.A provides an overview of federal labor law and the NFL CBA.  
Part III.B addresses protections in the NFL CBA that are relevant to 
protesting NFL players.  Part III.C addresses whether firing an NFL player 
for protesting during the national anthem would violate the NFL CBA.  
Finally, Part III.D addresses whether not hiring an NFL player who 
 
 60. Id. at 67. 
 61. 746 F. Supp. 154 (D.D.C. 1990). 
 62. See id. at 156 (recognizing that the federal government’s creating of a list of stores 
that distribute what it considers pornographic material could violate the First Amendment if 
the list is intended to serve an “unconstitutional motive” such as the facilitation of a private 
boycott of these stores). 
 63. See infra Part III.A–D.  For a full and current version of the NFL CBA, see NAT’L 
FOOTBALL LEAGUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (Aug. 4, 2011), 
https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T7GL-D7E4]. 
 64. See NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 63, at 5 (explaining that the only parties 
bound by the NFL CBA are the “players, Clubs, the [NFL Players Association], the NFL, 
and the Management Council,” and thus the NFL CBA does not provide any rights or 
remedies with respect to non-parties to the agreement). 
 65. See infra Part III.C–D. 
 66. See infra Part III.A. 
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previously protested during the national anthem would violate the NFL 
CBA. 
A.  An Overview of Labor Law and  
the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 
In the United States, most workers are “at-will” employees.67  “At-will” 
employees may be fired by their employer at any time for any reason or no 
reason at all.68  Under the National Labor Relations Act, however, 
employees in a unionized workplace enjoy the right to bargain collectively 
with their employees over “mandatory terms and conditions of 
bargaining”—hours, wages, and working conditions.69  Employers also 
must bargain over disciplinary procedures, including terms for terminating 
workers based on cause.70 
Although it is often presumed that employees in the United States 
unionize primarily for purposes of obtaining higher salaries, in reality, 
unionized workers may benefit most from the opportunity to garner both 
substantive and procedural protections against being terminated.71  Indeed, 
unionized employees often represent some of the most difficult employees 
in the private workforce to legally terminate.72 
 
 67. See Kathleen C. McGowan, Note, Unequal Opportunity in At-Will Employment:  
The Search for a Remedy, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 141, 142 (1998). 
 68. See id. at 142 (stating that “most employees are at-will, which means they can be 
terminated by their employer any time, for any reason or for no reason”); see also Wendy L. 
Stasell, How Far Is the Boss’s Reach, ABA J., Dec. 2000, at 32 (explaining that “[a]n at-will 
employee can be fired for any reason, so long as the termination does not violate some other 
law, such as nondiscrimination or whistleblower statutes”). 
 69. See Marc Edelman, The Future of College Athletes Players Unions:  Lessons 
Learned from Northwestern University and Potential Next Steps in the College Athletes’ 
Rights Movement, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1627, 1630 & n.7 (2017) (“Although parties are free 
to bargain about any legal subject, Congress has limited the mandate or duty to bargain to 
matters of ‘wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.’” (first quoting 
First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1981); then quoting 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d) (2012))). 
 70. HARRY C. KATZ ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 261 (4th ed. 2008) (explaining that when employers implement 
discipline only for just cause, employees gain freedom from “arbitrary discipline, discharge, 
or denial of benefits”); see also Wendi J. Delmendo, Determining Just Cause:  An Equitable 
Solution for the Workplace, 66 WASH. L. REV. 831, 831 (1991) (explaining that a majority of 
courts recognize that an employer’s promise to discharge an employee only for just cause 
represents an exception to the typical employment-at-will doctrine that allows the firing of 
an employee at any time, for any reason, except for an illegal reason). 
 71. See I’m a Professional.  What Can a Union Do for Me?, DEP’T PROF. EMPS., AFL-
CIO, http://dpeaflcio.org/survey/what-can-a-union-do-for-me [https://perma.cc/U3PR-
EU3L] (last visited Jan. 6, 2018) (explaining that “[u]nions protect workers from arbitrary 
employer actions relating to discipline and dismissals,” and “[t]hat protection makes jobs 
better and often leads union members to stay at their jobs longer than non-union workers. 
Better training, lower turnover and a clear role for workers’ voices in making decisions 
about how work gets done also mean that unions increase productivity”). 
 72. See, e.g., The Benefits of Collective Bargaining for Professionals, DEP’T PROF. 
EMPS., AFL-CIO, http://dpeaflcio.org/programs-publications/issue-fact-sheets/the-benefits-
of-collective-bargaining-for-professional-and-technical-workers/ [https://perma.cc/2VBA-
6AB8] (last visited Jan. 6, 2018) (explaining that a “union job is not a ‘job for life’” but “a 
union job does afford employees greater protection against unfair unilateral actions by 
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B.  Protections in the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement  
Relevant to Protesting Players 
For most of the past fifty years, the NFL players have participated in a 
collective bargaining relationship with the league’s thirty-two teams, in 
which they bargain over their mandatory terms and conditions of 
employment.73  As part of the CBA, NFL players sign a Standard Player 
Contract for a term of one or more years.74  During the life of this contract, 
a team may only remove a player from its roster if his “skill or performance 
has been unsatisfactory as compared with that of other players competing 
for positions” or, arguably, if the player has “engaged in personal conduct 
reasonably judged by [a team] to adversely affect or reflect on [the 
team].”75  However, language in the CBA, which takes precedence over the 
NFL Standard Player Contract,76 limits the maximum penalty an NFL team 
may impose for “conduct detrimental to [an NFL club]” to a four-game 
suspension and a fine equivalent to one week’s salary.77 
In addition, the CBA also includes an “Anti-Collusion” clause, which 
stipulates that no NFL club shall enter into any agreement with the league 
or any club as to whether to offer a contract to a particular player.78  
Pursuant to the CBA’s “Anti-Collusion” clause, NFL teams are prohibited 
from jointly imposing discipline on a player and from creating a blacklist of 
players with whom the teams collectively choose not to negotiate.79 
C.  Does Firing an NFL Player for Protesting  
Violate the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement? 
When analyzing the language of the NFL CBA, it is doubtful whether an 
NFL team may simply “fire” a player who is under contract simply for 
failing to stand during the national anthem.  First, there is not a single 
reference to the league’s national anthem policy anywhere in the league’s 
 
employers—after all, a workplace dispute has the potential to cost a person their job and, as 
a result, their livelihood”). 
 73. See Marc Edelman & Joseph A. Wacker, Collectively Bargained Age/Education 
Requirements:  A Source of Antitrust Risk for Sports Club-Owners or Labor Risk for Players 
Unions?, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 341, 341 (2010); see also History, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE 
PLAYERS ASS’N, https://www.nflpa.com/about/history [https://perma.cc/APV8-BSC5] (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2018). 
 74. See NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 63, at 256–64. 
 75. Id. at 260 (further noting that a “Club may terminate this contract.  In addition, 
during the period any salary cap is legally in effect, this contract may be terminated if, in 
Club’s opinion, Player is anticipated to make less of a contribution to Club’s ability to 
compete on the playing field than another player or players whom Club intends to sign or 
attempts to sign, or another player or players who is or are already on Club’s roster, and for 
whom Club needs room”). 
 76. See id. at 5 (stating that “[t]he provisions of [the NFL CBA] supersede any 
conflicting provisions in the Settlement Agreement, NFL Player Contract, the NFL 
Constitution and Bylaws, the NFL Rules, or any other document affecting terms and 
conditions of employment of NFL players”). 
 77. Id. at 180–86. 
 78. Id. at 119. 
 79. See id. 
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301-page CBA.80  At best, a team might argue that a player who protests 
during the national anthem violates a general prohibition against engaging 
in “conduct detrimental to an NFL club” under the CBA or has engaged in 
conduct that could be reasonably judged as reflecting negatively on a club 
under the Standard Player Contract.81  However, even there, such a 
conclusion is far from certain. 
In addition, even if one were to presume that protesting during the 
national anthem could constitute “conduct detrimental to an NFL club,” 
there is still a very strong argument that a team could not impose more than 
a “fine of an amount equal to one week’s salary and/or suspension without 
pay for a period not to exceed four (4) weeks.”82  The CBA explicitly notes 
that, in the context of a conflict between language in the CBA and that in 
the Standard Player Agreement, it is the CBA language that holds 
superseding weight.83 
Furthermore, even if an NFL team were to argue that the NFL’s national 
anthem policy, which appears in the league operating manual, is referenced 
by implication in the league’s CBA, the express language included in the 
NFL’s national anthem policy still does not necessarily impose any 
mandatory duty on NFL players.84  This is because the language in the 
NFL’s national anthem policy merely states that players “should stand at 
attention.”85  It does not state that players must stand.86 
D.  Does Not Hiring an NFL Player for Protesting  
Violate the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement? 
Finally, if an unsigned NFL player believes that his lack of employment 
is due to an agreement among teams not to sign him,87 the player may 
attempt to allege a violation of the “Anti-Collusion” clause in the CBA.88  
At the time of publishing this Article, former NFL quarterback Kaepernick 
had just filed a labor grievance against the thirty-two NFL teams, alleging 
that his unemployment resulted from collusion among the thirty-two NFL 
 
 80. See generally id. 
 81. Id. at 180–86, 260. 
 82. Id. at 181. 
 83. See id. at 5. 
 84. See id. (stating that the NFL CBA “represents the complete understanding of the 
parties on all subjects covered herein” and that “the [NFL Players Association] and the NFL 
waive all rights to bargain with one another concerning any subject covered or not covered 
in this Agreement for the duration of this Agreement, including the provisions of the NFL 
Constitution and Bylaws; provided, however, that if any proposed change in the NFL 
Constitution and Bylaws could significantly affect the terms and conditions of employment 
of NFL players, then the NFL will give the [NFL Players Association] notice of and 
negotiate the proposed change in good faith”). 
 85. Steinbuch, supra note 24 (noting that language says that teams “must” play the 
anthem before every game, but only that players “should” stand) (emphasis added). 
 86. Id. (emphasis added). 
 87. See NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 63, at 119. 
 88. See id. 
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teams, with U.S. President Donald Trump serving as an “organizing force” 
behind the collusion.89   
For Kaepernick or a similarly-situated player to prevail on a labor 
grievance of this nature, there would be a need for the grievant to produce 
actual evidence of an agreement among the NFL teams and not simply 
evidence of consciously-parallel behavior.90  Gaining such evidence would 
require the grievant to engage in extensive discovery under the CBA’s 
internal discovery process.91 
CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to predict whether a former NFL player who is fired—or not 
hired—based on his political protests would prevail in a resulting legal 
challenge.  If a former NFL player were to file a lawsuit challenging his 
termination under the First Amendment, the player’s primary legal obstacle 
would entail proving that his termination represents “state action,” based on 
either public ownership of an NFL sports facility or President Trump’s 
attempt to coerce, persuade, and intimidate the NFL into quashing the 
player’s political speech.  Among these two arguments, the second one—
coercion from the U.S. executive branch—seems to provide significantly 
stronger grounds for finding state action. 
In addition, if an NFL player—who is fired for protesting during the 
national anthem—wanted to bring a labor grievance against his team under 
the terms of the CBA, that player would need to successfully argue either:  
(1) his failure to stand at attention during the national anthem was not 
reasonably detrimental to his NFL club; or (2) his firing for such conduct 
lies outside of the permissible range of sanctions allowed under the CBA. 92 
Finally, if a protesting NFL player—who cannot thereafter find new 
employment—brings a collusion-related grievance against the thirty-two 
NFL teams under the NFL CBA, he would need to prove his lack of 
employment was based on an actual collusive agreement among the 
teams.93  Under this scenario, the burden of proof would lie with the former 
NFL player to show the existence of such an agreement.  Consequently, it 
 
 89. Michael Hiltzik, Kaepernick Blames Trump for NFL Collusion Against Him—And 
He Could Be Right, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2017, 9:35 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/ 
hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-kaepernick-trump-20171018-story.html [https://perma.cc/7Q6Y-JE7S]. 
 90. See NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 63, at 120 (stating that “[t]he failure by a 
Club or Clubs to negotiate, to submit Offer Sheets, or to sign contracts with Restricted Free 
Agents or Transition Players, or to negotiate, make offers, or sign contracts for the playing 
services of such players or Unrestricted Free Agents, shall not, by itself or in combination 
only with evidence about the playing skills of the player(s) not receiving any such offer or 
contract, satisfy the burden of proof set forth [to prove collusion under the CBA]”). 
 91. See generally Marc Edelman, Explaining Colin Kaepernick’s Collusion Grievance 
Against the NFL, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2017, 8:29 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
marcedelman/2017/10/15/explaining-colin-kaepernicks-collusion-grievance-against-the-nfl 
[https://perma.cc/PV6L-4ZT9] (discussing the need for Kaepernick, through his lawyers, to 
gather evidence of collusion in the discovery process); see also NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, 
supra note 63, at 113–14 (describing NFL discovery process). 
 92. See supra Part III.A–C. 
 93. See supra Part III.D. 
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would be an uphill battle for any player to prove collusion and doing so 
would require the player’s attorneys to engage in a long and time-
consuming internal discovery process. 
 
